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Abstract
The problem of nding the minimum tipping set in a super modular game
is known to be NP-hard. Here, I derive an approximation algorithm to nd a
small tipping set in such a game. In the special case of the uniform game, the
approximation provides the exact minimum tipping set. Interdependent secu-
rity is a growing eld. One model used for interdependent security is the airline
security model. This model is used as an example for the approximation meth-
ods, and was the working model for many of the proofs and strategies developed
to nd tipping sets and their approximations. This algebraic approach, which
makes use of group theory, is then evaluated for accuracy, It is then applied
to a dynamic approach, using a simple learning function without the complete
information often assumed.
This method links the non-greedy approximation to a version of SAT, and
a type of inuence graphs and the covering problem. The approximation fared
well when nding the key players in a game, but struggled with cascades.
viii
Chapter 1
1 Game Theory Concepts
Game theory is the study of decision making, usually in competitive systems.
It strives to understand how rational players, be they individuals, companies,
governments, or other entities, make strategic choices, when faced with a com-
petitive situation when the results of their action is not just dependent upon
their own action, but that of other involved parties the strategic choices can be
dicult to understand. Even with simple interdependency these interactions,
or games, between dierent players making dierent choices can exhibit com-
plex behavior. Computer science, math, and information theory have developed
systems to model these behaviors. Such systems have been used in politics, eco-
nomics, computer networks, security, and many other elds to model behavior.
[8][16]
To gain a greater understanding of this, we rst need to explore some general
concepts and terminology related to games. We will also develop the needed
notation to represent the ideas.
1.1 Introduction
To aid in further discussion and analysis of the eld of game theory, let us
dene some general terms. These will be used throughout this document. A
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game is a general system in which the involved parties are interacting, and their
results are dependent upon the choices of all or some of the other parties. These
parties are referred to as agents or players. Thus a game has multiple players,
competing, cooperating, or at the bare minimum interacting with each other,
generally with the intent to attempt to get their best results. These results are
called payos. The negative of these payos are, in some cases, referred to as
losses. Maximizing the payos (a common goal) is the same as minimizing the
losses. Each player in a game has options. These options are the set of actions
the player can choose to take, and are referred to as strategies. Each player
can have any number of strategies. A play of a game is the set of each players
choices of strategy. A play of a game determines the payos.
Sometimes these payos are computed to be the average of their possibilities,
or their expected value. The payo, or the expected value of the payo are terms
often used interchangeably. Sometimes these payos are referred to as utility,
and the study of the properties of these utilities is called utility theory. It is
worth noting that utility is inherently subjective. That is, each player sets how
they value the various payo options derived from the strategic choices. Thus
the payos of players are inherently non-comparable.
Another important concept in games is rationality. A fundamental concept
of game theory is that each player is assumed to be rational. By behaving
rationally, we mean that the players seek to maximize their own payo with no
regard for the other players. This is sometimes termed selsh, but we will use
the term rational to describe this behavior. [16][18]
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1.2 Types of Games
Often, to study games it is helpful to categorize games based upon their proper-
ties and common characteristics. Then we can study the special cases separately.
Here we show some common types of games.
1.2.1 Pure Strategy Games
Pure strategy games are games in which each of the players must choose exactly
one of their strategies for a play of the game. Thus a single play of the game
is a set of strategies, one from each player in the game. The payos are then
strictly determined by the strategic choices of the players and the denition of
the game. Each player has to choose their strategy deterministically, and cannot
rely on any random chance or device.
Pure strategy games are more intuitive, than mixed strategy games but often
just as complicated. It is conceptually similar to a discrete problem instead of
a continuous problem.[16][18]
1.2.2 Mixed Strategy Games
Mixed strategy games are similar to pure strategy games, except that each player
can determine their choice randomly, rather than deterministically. In these
games, players may weight their random choices to prefer certain strategies. In
some games, the strategies may have equal weight, and in others it might be
biased toward one choice or another. Often this ability actually simplies nding
solutions, or their existence, when compared to pure strategy games.[16][18] In
competitive situations, it is often benecial to choose randomly. For example,
when playing Paper Rock Scissors, the best strategy is to choose all options
uniformly randomly.
3
1.2.3 Zero Sum Games
One common type of game is a zero sum game. This is a game in which the
payos balance. That is, if one player gains X, the rest of the players must lose
X. It is easy to think of this as a group of players competing for a xed set
of resources. In order for one player to get a resource, the rest of the player
collectively must have lost that resource.
A game can be Mixed Strategy, and zero sum, or any other combination of
these qualities. A special case of this is the two player zero sum game in mixed
strategies. In this case, we can apply the Minimax theorem. In common terms,
this theorem says that if one player can guarantee a payo of X, then the other
player will get -X. This is intuitive for a two player game in that a player, in
maximizing payo, minimizes the opponent's payo.[16][18]
1.2.4 Non-Zero Sum Games
Alternatively, a game can be non-zero sum. In this case, players are not com-
peting for a xed resource or uniform value. In this case, one player's gain does
not necessitate the other players' loss. This is often the case in large, complex
interdependent systems.[16][18]
1.3 Solutions
There are several solution concepts in game theory. Generally a solution rep-
resents the state when all players settle. Given their choices, they have chosen
the best they can, maximizing their utility. In the case of mixed strategies, this
means that they choose the weights of strategies to maximize their utility. The
most common type of solution used is a Nash Equilibrium (NE). In a NE, no
player is willing to deviate from his choice alone. Thus it takes more than one
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player to move the system. NE are not necessarily unique solutions, and are not
necessarily optimal. NE are still commonly used because they well represent
how solution naturally evolve from competition. They also often produce feasi-
ble solutions. There can be several NE in a game, and they can be at dierent
payo values. [15][16][18]
1.4 Details of Games
Thus far we have introduced some general, intuitive explanations of games. Now
we will explore the relevant precise computational elements of games and the
specics needed for further analysis. After some notes on solutions and game
types, we will more closely examine a special type of game upon which most of
the following work is based.
The study of game theory strives to understand the behavior of agents, be
they people, companies, governments, or other entities in systems. We denote
these players by labeling them as player i. A single player game reduces to an op-
timization problem. Since we are interested in games with multiple players, we
use n to denote the number of players, and index the players i : 1, 2, ..., n for ref-
erence. Generally speaking, these systems are competitive, or non-cooperative.
We assume that these players are rational, that is, that they do what is in their
best interest to maximize their gain and minimize their loss from a situation.
Games can be as simple as Paper, Rock, Scissors, or as complex as derivative
markets. These systems arise in may areas, including advertising, networks,
negotiations, and security. [16][17]
Given a situation or play, each of the players has a set of strategies to follow.
We denote these strategies as si for each player i. The set of strategies can be
any action or combined action taken (or not taken) by a player. Herein, we
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are primarily concerned with the cases when si ∈ {0, 1} where 0 represents the
choice of a player not to take action, and 1 the choice to act or invest. Some-
times, it is in a player's best interest to choose randomly (with some dened
weight to each strategy) between these strategies, which is a mixed strategy. al-
though this research is concerned with pure strategy games, wherein the players
are limited to picking one strategy exclusively.
A play s is dened by the n-tuple s = (s1,, s2, ..., sn) where si ∈ {0, 1} denotes
the choice of pure strategy by a player i and 1 ≤ i ≤ n.[16] A player i's payo
or loss function is denoted as ui(s). This is often the average payo given the
actions of the players. We use S to denote the set of all possible distinct plays.
There are a total of 2n distinct plays denoted by S = {s|s = (s1, s2, ..., sn), si ∈
{0, 1}}in the games we discussed herein.
Of course, the analysis of such complex systems is somewhat divorced from
reality, thus we must develop a model of the payo functions. It is constructed as
a function U : S → Rn and dened by:U(s) = (u1(s), ..., un(s) where each ui is
the payo function for player i and s is the strategic choice of that player. Thus
U maps S → Rn, the payos of each player, given the play s = (s1, ...sn) ∈ S to
the payo vector for all players. Thus any game is completely dened by (S, U).
1.5 Super-modular Games
One important class of games is super-modular games. This class of games
stems from a class of functions by the same name. Super-modular functions
are functions with a property known as 'increasing dierences'.[16]. Intuitively,
'increasing dierences' means that as more players decide to use a strategy, the
more incentivized others are to do use the same strategy. Mostly,this quality
is utilized in cases with only two strategies, represented by 0 and 1. We use
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the notation si−i to represent the set of strategy choices S for every player
except i. To characterize this, we often examine the dierence in a player's
payos resulting from their choice. To examine tipping, we often consider the
dierence quantity:
ui(1i, s−i)− ui(0i, s−i)
Intuitively, this quanties the proposition of the player i to choose strategy
1 over 0 for any given distinct partial play s−i. If this value is positive, the
player will choose 1 instead of 0. In this paper, this will often be referred to as
the choice to 'invest' (1) or 'not invest' (0). For a game to be super-modular, it





−i) ≥ ui(1i, s−i)− ui(0i, s− i) (1)
if s
′
−i ≥ s−iwith strict inequality if s
′
−i > s−i[10][21]
In our case, the underlying binary lattice is dened by the 2n binary strings
of 1's and 0's under the partial order dened over the binary strings. It turns
out this lattice is also a hypercube of dimension n.[7]
1.6 Tipping
The focus of this work is on tipping. As mentioned above, NE are not unique,
and can vary in value. One NE can be considered superior, or more ecient,
than another. This prompts the interesting question of How do we move from
one NE, presumably an inecient one, to another one? This movement can be
achieved by externally motivating a set of players to change and letting the rest
follow suit, ending in another NE. A tipping set is a set of players that motivate
such a change.
A minimum tipping set is the minimum of such tipping sets. The primary
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interest of this work is in nding the minimum tipping set, or the smallest
amount of players to move from one NE to another.[8][10][3]The phenomenon we
are interested in is tipping. This is the transition from one NE to another, and
typically from an inecient NE to an ecient one. The above super-modularity
condition 1 is sucient to produce this tipping phenomenon in binary games
(games with two strategies). This has many applications, from market coverage,
social network saturation, and security or technology investment. Generally, this
type of dynamic arises when a single player rationally won't force transition of
the whole system to a new state alone, but if everyone chooses the new state
(or a sucient number of players) it would be better for everyone, or at least
the investing players. Then, the right players together choose to change, and
everyone, including the initially abstaining players follows suit rationally.
A similar phenomenon is called cascading, in which the players change one
at a time like dominoes, but in a perfect information system, with abstracted
transitional times, cascades don't come into play because each player would
know that the cascade would happen and skip to the investment strategy at the
end.[8][9][10]
1.6.1 Denitions
The study of games require us to have a set nomenclature. As discussed above,
(S, U) denes a game. We let S = {s|s = (s1, s2, ..., sn), si ∈ {0, 1}} so it is
a set of possible strategies for each play. Each si is the strategic choice of the
ithplayer. Here, n is the number of players, or agents in the game, indexed
1, ..., n. In our case, where the strategies are 0 or 1, this set of all actions has
cardinality |S| = 2n. Clearly, this is a n-tuple of n zeros or ones, thus the
cardinality. We use U to be the payo, equivalently gain or loss, by each of the
players.
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When studying these games, it is often useful to directly examine the impact
a player has on another. The common notation for this is as follows:
4j(s−j) = uj(sj, 1)− uj(s−j, 0)
Where 4j(s−j), is dened to be the incentive of player j to invest, given
that all the other players use their strategic choices in s. If this is positive for
payo, or negative for loss, it is in player j 's best interest to invest, choosing
strategy 1. To examine the impact of a player i on player j, we use the following
extension of this notation:
4j(s−i−j, 0i) = uj(s−i−j, 0i1j)− uj(s−i−j, 0i, 0j) (2)
4j(s−i−j, 1i) = uj(s−i−j, 1i1j)− uj(s−i−j, 1i, 0j) (3)
These show the incentive for player j rst if player i chose 0, then 1. To
quantify player i 's impact on player j, we use the following:
∆ij = 4j(s−i−j, 1i)−4j(s−i−j, 0i) =
(uj(s−i−j, 1i, 1j)− uj(s−i−j, 1i, 0j))− (uj(s−i−j, 0i1j)− uj(s−i−j, 0i, 0j) (4)
In a super-modular (or monotone) system, this value is always positive (or
negative) by denition for all i and j. Thus as more players invest, it can only
incentivized other players to invest as well. Intuitively, if there is an NE at
1n there is some subset of players who will make the other players invest as
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well. A trivial example of this is would be n− 1 players. Since 1n is a NE, the
remaining 1 player would be suciently incentivized to invest. This, coupled
with the presence of a NE at 0nand another at 1nis sucient to have a tipping
or cascading phenomenon.
1.6.2 Complexity of Tipping
Finding a solution to these kinds of problems is generally possible, but we are
interested in doing this eciently, thus we desire a minimum tipping set. This is
much more dicult given the combinatorial nature of player interactions. The
minimum tipping set is then to be derived from those sets. Hence, the problem
of nding the minimum tipping set is generally NP-complete. This has been
shown via reductions to SAT class problems.[12]
1.7 Interdependent Airline Security Game (IDS)
1.7.1 History of Airline Security Game
While the study of game theory has become more popular in recent years, it
has a long history of study and applications. Some ancient systems of law were
based on what were later determined to be cooperative game systems, and min-
max solutions rst were documented in the early 1700's.[2] Game theory, as
a discipline, has borrowed from elds of information theory, computer science,
and mathematics.
IDS games have been developed and modeled to solve many problems through-
out their history. After the Pan Am incident, these tools were turned to IDS
models for the airline industry. Since then, the eld has expanded quickly both
in its applications and depth of its academic study.[18]
In particular, Heal and Kunreuther (hereafter H-K) developed a model, using
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game theory, to explain the adoption of of security methods. In this case they
were concerned about entry points to baggage security, but the structure applies
to a much wider set of applications, from technology investment, to subsidies
or marketing.[13][18]
1.7.2 Airline Security Model
Let us formally dene the model used for analysis of airline security by H-K.
There are n players labeled 1 through n, each endowed with two pure strategies
denoted by 1 (invest) and 0 ( not invest). A play s is dened by the n-tuple
s = (s1,, s2, ..., sn) where si ∈ {0, 1} denotes the choice of pure strategy by
player 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Clearly 0 ≤ 1. There are a total of 2n distinct plays denoted
as follows:
S = {s|s = (s1, s2, ..., sn), si ∈ {0, 1}}
For a, b ∈ S, dene a binary relation ≤ as follows:
a ≤ b (or b ≥ a ) when ai ≤ bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(S,≤) is a poset and is indeed a complete lattice[21]. Let u : s → Rn
where u(s) = (u1(s), u2(s), ..., un(s)) denote the n-tuple of utility functions with
ui : S → R denoting the utility of the player i.
Let S−i denote a play (s1, ..., si−1, ∗, si+1, ..., sn) and (s−i, 1i) denote the play
(s1,, ..., si−1, 1i, si+1, ..., sn).
We now dene the airline security game which is predicated on the natural
assumption that no one can die no more than once[9]. The utility, or the pay-
o, is dened in terms of losses and the goal of the players is to minimize these
losses. Let ci > 0 be the cost of investment (choice of strategy 1) in security by
player i, Li > 0 be the cost or loss due to a catastrophic incident, pi > 0 be the
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probability that player i will suer a catastrophic loss due to his own inaction
(choice of strategy 0) and qij (0 ≤ qij ≤ 1) be the probability that player j will
suer a catastrophic loss due to inaction of player i. For later reference, dene
an n × n matrix Q = [qij] with qii = 0. Clearly, the o-diagonal elements of
Q dene the interdependency among the n players. It can be shown [13]that,
where u
(1)
i is the average cost due to self action and u
(2)
i is the average cost due
to the action of others, the total expected cost is given by:
ui(s) = u
(1)





i (s) = sici + (1− si)piLi (6)
u
(2)
i = (1− (1− si)pi)(1− Πj 6=i,(1− (1− sj)qji))Li (7)
where Πki=1ai = a1a2...ak refers to the product of the ai. Equation 7 gives the
expected loss for a two player IDS game. An example of a three person airline
game is given in Table 1 .
They are super-modular (monotone), which is a commonly exhibited behav-
ior in real world applications. This also means that given extreme NE, the NE
at 1nwill be more ecient than at 0n. The equations above separate nicely into
a dependent part and an interdependent part. The dependent part is the loss
do to the action or inaction of the player, while the inter-dependent part is the
loss due to the actions of other players.[9][10][13]
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1.7.3 Three Player Game
It is helpful to examine this general model via an example. Examine the three
player case, for players i, j, k. The above payo formulas are:
ui(s−i, 0i) = piLi + (1− pi)(1− Πj 6=i,(1− (1− sj)qji))Li
ui(s−i, 1i) = ci + (1− Πj 6=i,(1− (1− sj)qji))Li
In the case when no one is investing, for player one these become:
u1(s−1, 01) = p1L1 + (1− p1)(q21 + q31 − q21q31)L1
u1(s−1, 11) = c1 + (q21 + q31 − q21q31)L1
Evaluating these equations for each player gives us the equations in Table .
1.7.4 Structural Signicance of Airline Security Game
Binary games are interesting due to their relation with common mathematical
structures. The state space of a game can be represented as a lattice and a
hypercube. Here each state of a game, that is an element of S , is a vertex
whose coordinates are the ordered strategic choices of the players. [7][14] Equi-
libria can be explained using topological xed point theorems.[4] This can show
connections between elds of topology and graph theory that may be further
exploited to solve dicult problems.
Super-modular games provide structure to the game that manifest in many
common problems.[7][19][20][21] These problems are still dicult enough to be
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of interest, and often reective of realistic structures in competitive systems.
Those which involve moving from one uniform state or standard to another,
such as adoption of a policy, standard, or practice can have very real impact on
society. This can also be seen in estimations of how temporary subsidies impact
practices, which impacts economics and politics. This research is interested in
the class of models arising from the airline interdependent security investment
models [5][7][10][13][17]
1.8 Organizational note
Thus far we have explored some general game concepts and developed the basic
tools needed to analyze relevant systems.
In chapter 2 we use these tools, and expand on them to analyze the problem
of nding a minimum tipping sets. First we explore the details of the required
background information. We then conduct an analysis of the game, including
special cases. We then present a non-greedy approximation method to approx-
imate the minimum tipping set.
In chapter 3 We present some empirical information on dierent games and




2.1 Introduction and Background
A central concept in game theory is equilibrium. There are several types of
equilibrium, but the most common is Nash Equilibrium (NE). [7][15] An equi-
librium point occurs when the selected play is a play from which no player is
willing to deviate from his strategy alone. These NE are not unique, a game
can have several. They are also not necessarily equal, as NE can exist with dif-
ferent levels of value may exist in which all the players, including NE that are
strictly better, or dominate, other NE. We are interested in the transition from
one equilibrium to another. Given that in a NE no player is willing to deviate
alone, we are interested in nding a set of players who can move (or tip) the
game to another NE. We are interested in a phenomenon called tipping. Tip-
ping can be thought of as the movement of a game from one equilibrium state
to another. The set of players needed to commit to the new state in order to
move the entire system with them is called a tipping set, and the smallest such
set, if it exists, is the minimum tipping set, which is a focus of this research.[10]
While the study of game theory has become more popular in recent years,
it has a long history of study and applications. Game theory as been applied
across many elds, solving many problems arising from both cooperative and
competitive systems. Some ancient systems of law were based on what were
later determined to be cooperative game systems. One simple type of solution,
Min-max solutions, were rst documented in the early 1700's. [2] John von
Neumann's and John Nash's work in the early and mid-1900's launched game
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theory as a separate discipline with wide applications. Since then, the eld has
expanded quickly both in its applications and depth of its academic study.[18]
Games in general have been used to model a wide range of competitive
systems with rational behavior.[8][9][10][13][16] They provide a framework for
understanding an inuencing large, seemingly chaotic systems with independent
agents acting in their own best interest. While not always a reliable mechanism
for predicting human behavior, game theory has proven useful in the predic-
tion and optimization of rational agents, investment and business decisions, to
auctions and evolutionary systems.[8] [16]
When we discuss games we are discussing system in which independent
agents act in their own best interest and the results, or payos, of the sys-
tem are dependent on the combinations of the players' choices. Recall from
section 1.1 that such a system, or game, is said to be in an equilibrium state if
it is in no player's best interest to change strategy alone. A play of a game is the
players' choice of strategies from each player's strategy set. In this paper, the
strategy set is {0,1}, where 0 means not investing or not taking action, and 1
means investing or taking action. A state of a game is the set of plays, one from
each player. A tipping set is a set of players who, when motivated by external
inuences such as bribery or coercion, to change their strategy and move the
game to another equilibrium state. [10]
A common way of evaluating these states is to treat them as nodes of a
lattice, with dimension equal to the number of players. They can also be rep-
resented as a hypercube with a dimension equal to the number of players. This




With ever growing dependency through commerce and communication between
various parts of the globe, there is a greater need for the analysis and under-
standing of interdependent security (IS) among interacting agents. IS has been
successfully modeled using the framework of n-person (non-cooperative) game
theory[15]. In a series of seminal papers[9][10][13], H-K describe these models
and their applications to IDS games for airline security, vaccination games to
prevent the spread of infectious diseases, etc. The special features of this model
include the following: (a) each player is endowed with only two pure strategies
or actions, invest (1), and not invest (0) in security measures; (b) the players
are not allowed to use randomized strategies, which in turn implies that we
are interested only in the Nash equilibria (NE) in pure strategies[13]; (c) the
utility (negative of the cost) function for each player has two components. The
rst component is due to one's own action (1 or 0) and the second component
is due to the action (1 or 0), of the other players. This second component is
called the externality component, which in turn decides the level of interdepen-
dency among the players; and (d) a subset of players acting in collusion, by
the clever choice of their own actions, can inuence the externalities of other
players not in the coalition so as to force them to change their choice of actions.
This phenomenon, whereby one subset can exert inuence over another is called
tipping[7][15] or cascading.[10]
A condition for an n-person game to exhibit the tipping / cascading property
is that the payo (loss) function of the players must satisfy the increasing (or
decreasing) dierences property. This property is intimately associated with the
super-modularity of the utility functions[10][16]. In this paper we work with the
dierences in the loss which are the negation of the payo dierences. Another
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common reference to this increasing dierences property is to describe the game
as monotone.
Super-modular functions and functions with increasing dierences are de-
ned on lattices[16]. In our case, the underlying binary lattice is dened by the
2n binary strings of 1's and 0's under the partial order dened over the binary
strings. It turns out this lattice is also a hypercube of dimension n.[7]
2.3 Airline Security Games
As discussed in section 1.8, H-K have written substantially regarding IDS models
and their applications to specic elds of study, notably terrorist risks and airline
security.[9][10][13]
H-K present a model (see below) for analyzing these risks and their impacts
on adoption, player behavior, and tipping. In particular, they draw distinctions
between individual and industry optimal behavior based on the model. This
model allows them to apply tools such as, graphical and algebraic, of game
theory to solve these real world problems. Based on airline industry data, they
determine that acting on game theoretic analysis, the industry as a whole could
save money through the strategic adoption of security procedures. This was
represented by moving from the inecient equilibrium without investment to
an ecient equilibrium with universal investment. This improvement suggests
substantial uses in policy, as illustrated by the Pan Am incident reaction[9].
Later, in 2006, H-K explored mathematical approaches to nding the tipping
set in this problem.[10] Connecting the monotone nature of the game system
with the super modularity of the system allows the increasing dierences prop-
erty to become of use. Letting each player have a strategy of either 0 or 1,
and a position vector S, they examined the increasing dierences property. Let
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ui be the payo function of the player i. These assumptions, along with the
assumption of multiple, usually extreme equilibria, imply that there must exist
a tipping subset. Making use of the natural order on the hypercube of strategy
vectors, H-K have shown that for each agent i, the increasing dierences yields





−i) ≥ ui(1i, s−i)− ui(0i, s−i)
with strict inequality if s
′
−i > s−i
Intuitively, this means that the payo of a player choosing to invest (moving
from 0 to 1) increases, or does not decrease, if other agents choose to invest.
This is quantied, as mentioned previously in equations 234 as:
4j(s−i−j, 0i) = uj(s−i−j, 0i1j)− uj(s−i−j, 0i, 0j) (8)
and
4j(s−i−j, 1i) = uj(s−i−j, 1i, 1j)− uj(s, 1i, 0j) (9)
Equations 8 and 9 combine as follows:
∆ij = 4j(s−i−j, 1i)−4j(s−i−j, 0i) =
(uj(s−i−j, 1i, 1j)− uj(s−i−j, 1i, 0j))− (uj(s−i−j, 0i1j)− uj(s−i−j, 0i, 0j)) (10)
Equations 8, 9 and 10 provide a measure of the incentive to player i when j
changes from 0 to 1.
They then assume that the systems have at least 2 NE, one at 0n and one
at 1n, with the latter dominating (payos are better for every player in 1n). To
nd the (minimum) tipping set, they attempt to nd subsets of players who,
when their only strategy is 1, motivates all other players to choose 1, then nd
the minimum such set.
Admitting the diculty and complexity of this problem, assumptions are
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made to simplify the problem. H-K call it A1:
4ij(s) = 4ik(s) = 4i(s) = 4i
They then give, in the form of Proposition 2, a method for ranking the
players by this quantity to nd the smallest tipping set.
Proposition 2: Given A1, if a smallest T-set exists, then for some integer F
it consists of the rst F agents when agents are ranked by the value of 4i.
The rst part of our recent work focuses on exploring the consequences of
these two assumptions on the game structure, how to better exploit that struc-
ture to nd minimum tipping sets, and separating A1 into its two assumptions
and addressing them independently.
2.4 Model Analysis




−i, 1i)− ui(s′−i, 0i) ≥ ui(s−i, 1i)− ui(s−i, 0i) (11)
whenever s′−i ≥ s−i. Intuitively, this decreasing dierence condition states that
the loss for player i to change from strategy 0 to 1 does not increase when a
subset of the other players has already moved from 0 to 1. Recall that the utility
for two players is as follows:
ui(s) = u
(1)





i (s) = sici + (1− si)piLi (13)
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Figure 1: Game Chart
u
(2)
i = (1− (1− si)pi)(1− Πj 6=i,(1− (1− sj)qji))Li (14)
where Πki=1ai = a1a2...ak refers to the product of the ai. An example of a three
person airline game is given in Table 1.
which measures the change in the incentive for player j to change from 0 to 1
resulting from a similar change by player i. It can be veried that the super-
modularity condition[5]implies that 4ij(s−i−j) ≥ 0.
Following H-K[13] the airline security game is state independent (SI) if
4ij(s−i−j) is the same for all s−i−j where s−i−j denotes any one of the 2n−2
strategies by all other players except i and j. Similarly, the above game is said
to be player independent (PI) if 4ij is independent of the choice of i.
Here we only analyze the impact of SI on the tipping set. Our analysis is
predicated on an assumption, namely we consider an n person super-modular
airline security game where there are exactly two NE, one at 0nand another at
1n. Recently, Dhall et al[7] have shown that a strict super-modular game can
have up to 2n/2 NE. Analysis of tipping in super-modular games with more than
two NE is wide open at this time.
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Figure 2: Three Player Lattice
Binary Lattice of dimension 4
Table 1: Three Player Losses
Airline Game matrix for 3 players
Play \
Cost
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
(000) p1L1 + (1−








p3) ∗ (q13 +
q23 −
q13q23)L3



















(101) c1 + q21L1 p2L2 c3 + q23L3
(110) c1 + q31L1 c2 + q32L2 p3L3
(111) c1 c2 c3
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2.5 Analysis
Our recent work focuses on two approaches to exploring this model. First,
we further analyze the assumptions proposed by HK and focus on tipping in
the State Independent cases of the Airline Security game. We present a three
player example and a four player example before analyzing the general case of SI
games. We then turn to the more complex general case games, and an algebraic
method for approximating the minimum tipping set.
2.6 Analysis of SI
To illustrate the key features of our approach to nding the minimum tipping set
in a super-modular airline security game satisfying the SI condition, we consider
the n=3 and n=4 player cases.
2.6.1 Three player game
Consider the case when i=2 and j=1. Since there are only three players, s−i−j
takes on only two values, 0 and 1. The SI condition stated above becomes:
421(03) = 421(13) (15)
Using the payo values from Table 1 and the expressions (8) - (10) the above
equality (15) becomes:
[c1 + q31L1]− [p1L1 + (1− p1)q21L1] = [c1 + (q21 + q31 − q21q31)L1]
− [p1L1 + (1− p1)(q21 + q31 + q21q31)] (16)
When simplied, the SI condition (16) becomes
(p1L1)q21q31 = 0 or q21q31 = 0 (17)
because p1L1 > 0 by assumption.
Clearly, there are 3∗ 2 = 6 pairs of (i, j). Considering the other ve possible
conditions imposed by the SI condition, we get 412(0) = 412(1); 413(0) =
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413(1); 421(0) = 421(1); 423(0) = 423(1) and432(0) = 432(1). Again using
the relations (8) - (10) and the entries in Table 1 we obtain the following three
conditions:
q21q31 = 0, q12q32 = 0, q13q23 = 0 (18)
(18) Verbally, the SI condition requires the product of the o-diagonal el-
ements in each column of the 3x3 matrix Q to be zero. Suppose we set both
q12 = 0 = q32, then the second column of Q is zero, which implies that player 2
does not have externality and is not aected by any other player. This choice
denes a degenerate case where player 2 can be dropped from the consideration
for the tipping set. To avoid this degeneracy, it is assumed that in each column
of Q, there is exactly one non zero o-diagonal entry in each column of Q.
Guided by this non-degeneracy requirement, it follows that the condition
(18) can be enforced modulo a permutation in one of two ways:
q21 = q12 = q13 = 0 and q31 6= 0, q32 6= 0, q23 6= 0 (19)
and
q21 = q32 = q13 = 0 and q31 6= 0, q32 6= 0, q12 6= 0 (20)
Conditions (19) and (20) can be visually depicted as a directed graph with
3 nodes and 3 directed edges where the in degree of each node is one, as shown
in Figures 3a and 3b respectively. It is tting to call these inuence graphs.
Clearly any node in the 2-cycle in Figure 3a and any node in the 3 cycle in
Figure 3a is a minimum tipping set.
Remark: Impact of SI on inuence graphs: Without the SI condition,
the inuence graph is a complete directed graph. In this case one must consider
the set of all n! possible orderings of 4j's in (8) to nd the smallest tipping set.
Remark: Impact of SI on Nash equilibria: For the general 3-player
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game in Table 1, conditions for NE at 000 and 111 are given by
0 ≤ 1− c1
p1L1
≤ q21 + q31 − q21q31; 0 ≤ 1−
c2
p2L2
≤ q12 + q32 − q12q32
and
0 ≤ 1− c3
p3L3
≤ q13 + q23 − q13q23
(21)
Under the SI conditions in (19) , the above condition for NE in (21) becomes
0 ≤ 1− c1
p1L1
≤ q31, 0 ≤ 1−
c2
p2L2




Clearly (22) implies (21) but not vice versa. Because our analysis is predi-
cated on the condition that we have two NE at 000 and 111, the conditions for
the tipping set under SI in general do not carry over to general airline games. In
other words, nding the minimum tipping set in general super-modular games
is more complex than those with SI. Similar arguments can be made using the
SI condition (20) in (21).
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Table 2: Four Player Interdependence Matrix
12 13 14 21 23 24 31 32 34 41 42 43
q12 q13 q14 q21 q23 q24 q31 q32 q34 q41 q42 q43
or or or or or or or or or or or or
q32 q23 q24 q31 q13 q14 q21 q12 q14 q21 q12 q13
q42 q43 q34 q41 q43 q34 q41 q42 q24 q31 q32 q23
2.6.2 The Four Player Game
Setting i=2 and j=1, since s−i−j has four possible values, 00, 01, 10, and 11.
The SI conditions becomes:
421(00) = 421(01) = 421(10) = 421(11) (23)
By combining the relations (8) - (10), with the payo for the 4 player airline
games[7], the SI condition takes the following form:
either q12 = 0 or q32 = q42 = 0 (24)
Clearly there are 4x3=12 pairs (i, j) with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 4. Considering each of
these pairs in turn we get a condition similar to (24). For completeness these
12 conditions are given in Table 2 where in each column either the element in
the rst row is zero or those in the second and third rows are zeros.
Combining these with the non-degeneracy requirement, it turns out that
there are exactly six distinct patterns modulo a permutation for the SI condi-
tions. The resulting six inuence graphs are given in Figure 4. In Figure 4a
there are two 2-cycles and hence the minimum tipping set has two players, one
from each two cycles. In all the other ve cases in Figure 4, the graph is weakly
connected. In each of those cases, any player who is a member of the directed
cycle constitutes a minimum tipping set.
Remark: In any given realization of the game satisfying the SI condition,
only one of these inuence graphs will be applicable. So, in general one could
use the standard depth rst search to identify the cycles in the inuence graph.
The minimum tipping set is then made of one node from each cycle. This idea
readily generalizes to the n-person game.
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Figure 4: Four Player Inuence Graphs
(a) Double Cycle (b) Full Cycle




2.7 Analysis of SI - General case
2.7.1 Extreme Equilibria
Many of the tools used to analyze tipping in super modular games are to be ap-
plied only when tipping from one extreme equilibria (0n) to another (1n). Many
game cases do not exhibit this behavior. Here we give methods for reducing SI
games without extreme equilibria to games with extreme equilibria in order to
apply our well known tools.
Given a SI super-modular game without an equilibria at 1n, we can use re-
peated play from 1n or some other method to nd an equilibria at the highest
level of the the lattice. That is, an equilibria with the largest number of invest-
ing players. By super-modularity, the nodes that will not tip when all others
investing will never invest. Thus they can be removed from the analysis and
assumed to never invest for the payo calculations of other players. This could
disconnect other players, who would be removed in the same fashion. This
yields a new game with an equilibrium at 1n−v where v is the number of players
not investing in the top equilibrium.
Against the back drop of these examples, we now state the general results.
We begin with a denition. An n-person airline super-modular game is non-
degenerate if there is exactly one non-zero o-diagonal element in each column
of the nxn matrix Q = [qij] with qii = 0. Our rst result relates the SI condition
to the non-degeneracy dened above.
2.7.2 General Airline Security
Lemma 1: SI holds i each player is eected by at most one other player.
Proof :
First we show that State Independence implies if each player is eected by
at most one other player.









Now, let qij 6= 0. Given any other player, called l, we see that the following
must hold:
4ij(1−i−j−l, 1l) = pjqij = 4ij(1−i−j, 0l) = pjqij(1− qlj)
The k is excluded so that we can see that it is included in the second product,
but not the rst. Thus we have:
pjqij = pjqij − qlj(pjqij)
Which, along with the previous assumptions that pj 6= 0 implies:
−qlj(pjqij) = 0 =⇒ qlj = 0
Thus State Independence implies the Independence Condition.
Now to show that if each player is eected by at most one other player, this
implies State Independence. Assume we have a game as dened above for which




If qij = 0 then all 4ij = 0 and the Independence is trivial, so we consider
the case when qij 6= 0. That and the condition that each player is eected by
at most one other player implies that all other qkj = 0∀k 6= i which means that
the product terms must be the multiples of 1's regardless of state, so the game
has State Independence. Therefore State Independence and the condition that
each player is eected by at most one other player are equivalent.

Recall from above that the non-degeneracy condition can be visually de-
picted by the inuence graphs (IG). Formally, an IG is a directed graph G =
(V,E) with |V | = n and |E| =n with the added requirement that the in degree
of each node is one. Thus every pattern of qij satisfying the non-degeneracy con-
dition ts within an equivalence class of inuence graphs where the members of
an equivalence class are obtained by graph automorphisms.
Thus, for n=3, there are exactly two equivalence classes (see Figure 3) and
there are only six equivalence elements for n=4 (see Figure 4). It can be veried
that for n=5, there are exactly thirteen equivalence classes as shown in Table 3.
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At this time, enumerating the number of equivalence classes of inuence graphs
for any n is open. However, we can readily catalog many of the key structural
properties of these graphs. 1) Given any integer n ≥ 3, there are exactly (n−1)
subsets of inuence graphs, one corresponding to each value of the parameter
2 ≤ k ≤ n. 2) For a given k in this range, the kth subset contains graphs with
k-cycles. The number nk of k-cycles in a graph in this subset can vary in the





3) In a graph with nk cycles, the rest of the (n−knk) nodes
not included in a cycle are attached to the nk cycles in an arbitrary manner or
else they would not be connected. An example of this enumeration for n=5 is
given in Table 3.
We now state our main result relating to the properties of the minimum
tipping set in games satisfying the SI condition.
Theorem 1: In an n-player game with SI, 1) The cardinality, |T| of the
tipping set T is equal to the number of cycles in the inuence graph induced
by the non-degeneracy condition. Clearly, 1 ≤ |T | ≤ n
2
. 2) While any node in a
given cycle would tip all the players associated with that cycle, the node with
the longest out degree will bring about the tipping in the shortest time.
As an illustration, refer to Figure 5. If we pick P1 as the minimum tipping
set, P1 will rst force P2 to change who in turn will simultaneously inuence
P3 and P4. On the other hand, if we pick P2 as the minimum tipping set, then
this will simultaneously force all the other to tip.
2.8 Complexity and Approximation of Tipping in a Super
modular game
Analysis of tipping is concerned with the dierence
ui(s−i1i)− ui(s−i0i) (25)
where (s−i, 1i, s−i, 0i) is an edge in the complete lattice considered as a hyper-
cube. A sequence of dierences along a path in the hypercube connecting the
NE at 0n to the one at 1n is given by
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Table 3: 5 Player Graphs
k
5 n5 = 1
4 n4 = 1
3 n3 = 4
2 n2 = 7
2 n2 = 7
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ui(0
n−11i)−ui(0n−10i) ≥ ui(0n−21i1j)−ui(0n−21i0j) ≥ ... ≥ ui(1n−11i)−ui(1n−10i)
(26)
Since 0n and 1n are NE, clearly ui(0
n−11i)−ui(0n−10i) > 0 and ui(1n−11i)−
ui(1
n−10i) < 0. That is, the above sequence of decreasing real numbers starts
from a positive value and ends up at a negative value. Thus there is a zero
crossing point that corresponds to a subset {k1, ..., ki} players choosing pure
strategy 1. But there are (n)! distinct sequences corresponding to (n)! disjoint
paths in the underlying hypercube. Hence, we get (n)! subsets, one for each
path. The minimum tipping set is then to be derived from those sets. Hence,
the problem of nding the minimum tipping set is generally NP-complete.[12]
HK proved that for the special case satisfying two conditions (player and
state independence assumptions) there exists a minimum tipping set. Above we
gave a simpler algorithm to nd such a tipping set for this special case. Here
our goal is to nd an approximation to the minimum tipping set for the general
case.
2.8.1 An Approximation Algorithm - Hypercube step
Recall that a given decreasing sequence of inequalities of the dierences in the
losses uniquely induces a mapping of the sequences in (26) onto edges in the







(n−1)−−−→ (1n−11i, 1n−10i) (27)
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where clearly (0n−11i, 0
n−10i)is an edge in the hypercube [19]. Thus, one end
(say the right end) of the starting edge in the above sequence of edges traces a






This path is from the NE 0n−10i to a neighbor 1
n−10i of the NE 1
n. Similarly,
the left end traces a corresponding path in the complementary sub-cube of
dimension n− 1 dened by ith bit equal to 1, namely
0n−11i
1−→ 0n−21i11
2−→ ... (n−1)−−−→ 1n−11i (29)
Here we have a path from the neighbor 0n−11i of the NE at 0
n to the NE at
1n. Our approximation algorithm relies on the well-known topological property
of node disjoint path distribution in a hypercube with nodes representing states
of the game.
Theorem 2 [14]: Let x and y be nodes in a hypercube of dimension k where
the Hamming distance between x and y, H(x, y) = r for some 1 ≤ r ≤ k. Then
(a) there are exactly r node disjoint paths each of length r between x and y (b)
there are exactly (k − r) node disjoint paths each of length r + 2 and (c) The
set of all paths in groups a and b are node disjoint.
We apply this theorem to the two nodes x = 0n−11iand y = 1
n−11i with
Hamming distance n − 1 in the sub-cube of dimension n − 1 whose ith bit is
xed at 1. Therefore, there are r=n-1 node disjoint paths each of length n− 1
in that sub-cube.
Thus, if we denote the path in (28) succinctly as
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0n−10i{1, 2, ..., n− 1}1n−10i (30)
where the {} term is the order of dimensions along which you move to the next
node in the path from 0n−10i to 1
n−10i. It can be shown [14] that by left circular
shift the elements in the ordered set we can generate the n-1 node disjoint paths
in the n-1 dimensional sub-cube. These are given by
0n−10i

1 2 3 ... n− 2 n− 1
2 3 4 ... n− 1 1
3 4 5 ... 1 2
. . . ... . .
. . . ... . .
. . . ... . .
n− 1 1 2 ... n− 3 n− 2

1n−10i (31)




1 2 3 ... n− 2 n− 1
2 3 4 ... n− 1 1
3 4 5 ... 1 2
. . . ... . .
. . . ... . .
. . . ... . .
n− 1 1 2 ... n− 3 n− 2

1n1i (32)
Thus, for each player i, there are n − 1 distinct increasing sequences of
inequalities that start from a negative number and end in a positive number.
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Hence, for all n players, there are a total of n(n − 1) = O(n2) sequences and
hence O(n2) subsets of players who are potential candidates for the tipping set.
Our goal is to nd a minimum tipping set from these O(n2) candidate subsets.
2.8.2 An Example
Consider an example of a n = 4 player airline game with the following values of




0 .99 .02 .02
1 0 0 0
0 .99 0 .02
0 .99 .02 0

Then using the expression in (14) we can readily compute the 16× 4 payo
(or loss in our case) table for each of the 24 = 16 plays for each of the 4 players.
For lack of space, we will not explicitly show this table. It can be veried that
for this choice of parameter values, 04 and 14 are two NE with 14 being better
than 04. 14 is optimal in this case. Applying the approximation algorithm
developed previously, we get three disjoint sequences of inequalities induced by
the three node disjoint paths for Player 1 as follows. Referring to the hypercube
in Figure 2 the rst disjoint sequence is given by
u1(1000)−u1(0000) ≥ u1(1100)−u1(0100) ≥ u1(1110)−u1(0110) ≥ u1(1111)−u1(0111)
which for the above example becomes 99 ≥ −1 ≥ −1 ≥ −1.
It follows that {2} is a candidate tipping set for player 1. That is, if player
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Table 4: First Candidates
Candidate tipping sets
candidate tipping sets Path 1 Path 2 Path 3
T1 {2} {2, 4} {2, 3, 4}
T2 {1, 3, 4} {1, 3, 4} {1, 3, 4}
T3 {1, 2, 4} {1, 4} {1, 2, 4}
T4 {1, 2, 3} {1, 3} {1, 2, 3}
2 changes his strategy from 0 to 1, some other players can reduce their losses
by switching from 0 to 1. Thus, player 2 has inuence over those other players.
Similarly, the second sequence
u1(1000)−u1(0000) ≥ u1(1001)−u1(0001) ≥ u1(1101)−u1(0101) ≥ u1(1111)−u1(0111)
which for the above example becomes 99 ≥ 99 ≥ −1 ≥ −1
from which we get {2, 4} as a candidate tipping set. From the third sequence
u1(1000)−u1(0000) ≥ u1(1010)−u1(0010) ≥ u1(1011)−u1(0011) ≥ u1(1111)−u1(0111)
which leads to 99 ≥ 99 ≥ 99 ≥ −1.
from which we get {2,3,4} as a candidate tipping set.
By repeating the above procedure for Players 2, 3, and 4, we can obtain
three candidate tipping sets for each of the players, which is summarized in
Table 4
Our goal is to nd a minimum tipping set from these n(n−1) = 12 candidate
tipping sets.
In the following Section, we describe a simple algebraic method for extracting
a minimum tipping set.
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2.8.3 An Approximation Algorithm - Algebraic Step
Above, we transformed similar facts about state independent games into a graph
form to examine the inuence patterns. We constructed these inuence graphs
by representing each player by a node i with an edge from player 2 to player 1
if player 2's choice to invest impacts or inuences player 1 directly.
Generating such a graph for this example gives us the graph in Figure 5.
General super modular games lack some of the structure we exploited in state
independent games. Unlike state independent games, one node's inuence is
not enough to tip given node. In this example, all of the inuencing nodes are
needed to tip a node, thus adding complexity. To address this added challenge,
we have developed an algebraic method for nding a minimum tipping set.
Let Σ = {0, 1}, let + and ∗ denote the usual logical AND and OR operators
respectively. For simplicity, a ∗ b is denoted by ab. Then, (Σ,+, ∗) denes a
commutative semi-ring. For all a, b ∈ Σ, we have a + a = a, aa = a, a + ab =
a(1 + b) = a.
Let a, b, c, d be the four binary variables corresponding to players 1 though
4 respectively. We now encode a subset {1, 2, 4} of players by abd. Accordingly,
the information in Table 4 can be encoded as follows:
T1 = b+ bd+ bcd = b
T2 = acd+ acd+ acd = acd
T3 = abd+ ad+ abd = ad (33)
T4 = abc+ ac+ abc = ac
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These expressions represent the conditions for each player to choose to invest.
T1 gives the conditions for player a, T2, for b, and so on.
First, we can algorithmically trim the number of players to examine. While
this is not needed in order to get an answer, it improves both the accuracy of
the approximation and the typical run time.
1) Any case in which a player's action is determined entirely by a single
other player, we can collapse those players. In the context of the game, this is
because the inuences caused by the impacting player contains the inuences of
the other. In this example, b completely determines the action of a. This means
that the impact of b contains the entire impact of a, and that when picking
minimum tipping sets, there is no reason to pick a. Collapsing a into b requires
moving a's inuences to b. This is to make sure that b now inuences all players
that a previously did. This should be done one at a time in order to stop cycles
when a node is inuenced only by itself.
If no such players exist, we simply move on to the next step. Then from 33
we get:
T2 = bcd;T3 = bd;T4 = bc
2) We also do not want to double count a player. If a player is externally
motivated to invest, we do not care about the conditions to tip that player. To
reect that, we add to each expression the set consisting only of that player.
This yields:
T2 = b+ bcd = b; T3 = c+ bd; T4 = d+ bc
This canceling and trimming procedure can be thought of as a variant of
Unit Propagation, which is a technique used in solving satisability problems.
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Figure 5: Multi-Graph
Now we are ready for the core procedure. We want the value of each of these
expressions to be 1, which is the same as their product being 1. Thus we want
to nd the minimum subset variables to set to 1 such that
T2 ∗ T3 ∗ T4 = 1
Substituting from above we get:
(b)(c+ bd)(d+ bc) = 1
(bc+ bd)(d+ bc) = (bcd+ bc+ bd+ bcd) = 1
Thus we have candidate tipping sets of bcd, bc, bd bcd. Any of these will give
a tipping set, but since we are interested in minimum tipping sets, we take one
of the smaller sets bc or bd. to choose for our minimum set.
2.9 Approximation Complexity
The algebraic step of the approximation presented is far from trivial. In fact,
we are approximating what is known as the Minimum Monotone Satisability
Assignment (MMSA)[6]
An instance of the MMSA problem is a monotone formula τ over a basis of
logical-and and logical-or (or disjunction and conjunction). A solution takes the
form of an assignment of the independent variables of τ such that τ is true. The
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objective function that is minimized is the number of variables in the assignment
which are equal to true.[1]
The transformation to this problem is trivial. The combined equation T2 ∗
T3 ∗ T4 = 1 is exactly the required tautology, with 1 representing true and the
Boolean semi-ring over * and + is exactly the logical operators for the MMSA
problem. The length of the propositions is bound by a function of the number
of players. Thus we have an easy transformation to MMSAn>3.
This problem is not only a complex problem to solve, but it is complex to
approximate within a factor of 2log(1−o(1)n [1] In graph terms, this is equivalent to
solving (or approximating) the label-cover of a bipartite graph.[6] This is still an
improvement, just not to the worst case. The run time of these approximations
are much faster than the original NP problem we are addressing. This is due,
in large part, the algebraic collapsing method above and is similar to the use of




3.1 Airline Security - The Uniform Case
One special form of the Airline Security game is the uniform case. In this case,
the agents behave identically with
pi = pj = p, ci = cj = c, Li = Lj = L, qij = qkl = q (34)
By examining the behavior of the approximations in this case along with
the case's properties, we gain some insight regarding the performance of the
method. The most relevant property of the uniform game is the following:
Lemma 2: A uniform game can be tipped by any set S of players with
|S| > n− 1− log(c/pL)
log(1−q) .
Proof : Generally, the decision of player i to invest is determined by:
piLi + (1− pi)Qi(S)Li − (c+Qi(S)Li) > 0 (35)
where Qi(S) = 1−
∏
i 6=j,j /∈S(1− qji)
If 35 is true, the player i will invest.
35reduces through simplication as follows:
piLI − c+Qi(S)Li − piQi(S)Li −Qi(S)Li > 0
piLi − c− piQi(S)Li > 0
piLi(1−Qi(S)) > c
1−Qi(S) > cipiLi




with Q(S) = 1− (1− q)n−1−|S|
Note that this quantity is independent of identity, and only depends on p,c,L,
q, and the number of investing players in S.
Let n − 1 − |S| = k Then the condition becomes: 1 − (1 − (1 − q)k) =
(1− q)k > c
pL
Since all are constant except for k, we can see that we can determine the
number of players needed to tip the system as:





n− 1− |S| < log(c/pL)
log(1−q)
|S| > n− 1− log(c/pL)
log(1−q)
This is the same for all players. Thus if one player is tipped by |S| investing
players, all the remaining ones will be as well thus there can be no cascades.
Note that all players payo is the same, so the choice of which players are
chosen is irrelevant. Any |S| players will tip the system.

Corollary 1: In the uniform game, there can be no cascades.
Proof : By above lemma, all players are tipped by any |S| other players.
Less than |S| players will not tip any single player by the construction of the
condition from a single activation function. If it were to tip a single player then
all the other players would make the same decision and tip, thus giving a tipping
set less than |S|.

Lemma 3: The hypercube left shift sampling will nd a set of n-1 groups
of |S| consecutive players to tip each individual player.
Proof: Since any s=|S| players will tip a given player, the rst set of length
s that is tested will tip the player, thus the rst length s consecutive player
42
set is chosen. Now, as per the algorithm, we left shift our starting point, then
repeat. This gives us another length s set that is shifted one player to the left.
Thus we end up with n-1 length s tipping sets for each player.

Theorem 3 Given the above a uniform game and n-1 groups of |S| players
tipping each single player, the algebraic simplication will nd the optimal
solution.
Proof : Given an order there are only n dierent length s contiguous sets of
players. Each player has the n-1 that do not contain themselves. Thus given
any length s candidate set S, it will be contained in the possible candidates list
for all the players not contained in S.
This along with simple Boolean algebra, gives the correct result. That is,
the set S will tip all players except the ones in S, which would be externally
motivated by having selected S as the tipping set.

Example
Now we look at how the approximation system behaves in this context. Since
any k players will tip any player. For players a,b,c, and d, set the following
parameters:
p = 0.1, c = 99, q = .009, L = 1000 (36)
For clarity, examine what happens when |S|=2. This means that any 2
players will tip any player, thus each player's set of candidate tipping sets will
be the rst two corrected players and the corresponding rst two from every left
shift. So for players a,b,c,d, we would have:
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a : bc, cd, bd
b : cd, ad, ac
c : ab, bd, ad
d : ab, bc, ac
Now, when we apply the algebraic method on this set, we get:
a = a+ bc+ cd+ bd
b = b+ cd+ ad+ ac
c = c+ ab+ bd+ ad
d = d+ ab+ bc+ ac
This system of equations simplify as:
a ∗ b ∗ c ∗ d = 1
(a+ bc+ cd+ bd)(b+ cd+ ad+ ac)(c+ ab+ bd+ ad)(d+ ab+ bc+ ac) = 1
(ab+ ad+ ac+ bc+ cd+ bd)(cd+ bc+ ac+ ab+ bd+ ad) = 1
ab+ ad+ ac+ bc+ cd+ bd = 1
This nds several size 2 tipping sets, which is the optimal. [3]
44
3.2 Empirical Results
In order to test our approximation method, we chose a couple of models. First,
we chose the well studied and analyzed airline security investment model from
Heal and Kunreuther.[9]
3.2.1 Airline Security - Methodology
In this model, detailed in the sections above, we start with the number of
players n. There are n players labeled 1 through n, each endowed with two
pure strategies denoted by 1 (invest) and 0 ( not invest). A play s is dened
by the n-tuple s = (s1,, s2, ..., sn) where si ∈ {0, 1} denotes the choice of pure
strategy by player 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each player, we have the loss of an event,
Li, the probability of such an event occurring due to player i's inaction, pi, and
the cost of investment ci. These together determine the dependent component
of the loss. We then also have the matrix of interdependency, where each entry
qji is the probability of player i suering a loss due to the inaction of player j.
Thus we have a loss function for each non-investing player given by:









As previously discussed, the interesting structure stems from the matrix
of qji while the pi, Li, ci are simple constraints for the system. Thus, for our
purposes, we set the p, L, c to all be invariant among players, and with bounds
giving room to choose a wide range of q.
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We used three dierent case sizes, 10 players, 15 players, and 20 players. For
each of these scenarios, a set of games is randomly generated. We set the values
for p's, L's, and c's as denoted in Table 5, then randomly generate q's. The q's
completely determine the interdependence dynamics, thus the choice of p, L,
and c is only important to give the possibility of extreme equilibria as discussed
previously. The q's are chosen from a uniform distribution between 0 and p.
This makes sure the q's are less than or equal to the p's, which matches typical
scenarios in game examples. A game is a valid, or viable, if it has NE at both all
0 and all 1. The set variables are chosen to allow some range of viable games, so
we can have a good amount of valid games from the randomization. After the
q's are generated, the games were evaluated and thrown out if extreme NE were
not found. A smaller sample size for 20 players was used due to computational
limitations. Results are summarized in Tables 6 and 7.
3.2.2 Observations
As expected, the approximation runs were not optimal, but did give reasonable
approximations for the tipping sets. The sets given were always tipping sets,
but smaller sets often existed. One interesting note is that the dierence in
approximate and exact solutions, in terms of percent error, decreased as the
number of players increased. This may be due to the completely random distri-
bution of the q's. This would be roughly equivalent to the system not having
many long cascades, which is consistent with random generation.
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Table 6: Results Summary (Mean)
Players Exact Approx Di % Di Sample Size Std Dev
10 4.68 7.20 2.53 54% 826 0.189
15 8.89 12.08 3.19 35% 999 0.073
20 13.37 17.04 3.67 27% 99 0.052
Table 7: Results Summary (Median)
Players Exact Approx Di % Di Sample Size Std Dev
10 5 7 2 40% 826 0.189
15 9 12 3 33% 999 0.073
20 13 17 4 31% 99 0.052
3.3 Dynamic Game Implications
There is another class of attempted approximations to nding minimum tipping
sets. These involve solving the problem in a continuous space, using dynamic
approaches. For some cases this works well, mirroring partial investments and
partial results. In other cases, mostly all or nothing cases, or ones with certain
key players inuencing others, these systems may not work as well. Here the
learning method employed by Kearns and Ortiz for approximating tipping sets
is used and examined[11].
3.3.1 Method Summary
One of the cases examined in [11] was a non-uniform transfer case. While this
did not meet the requirements to use the primary method in their work, a second
learning / dynamics method as also used for non-uniform transfer examples.
To generate a tipping set, the system is simulated with subsets of players
clamped to constant investment. The other players investment is then consid-
ered in the continuous space between 0 and 1. Each player is allowed to adjust
their amount of investment according to what is best for them. Formally, each
player adjusts their level of investment, xt at time t by:
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xt+1 = xi + (0.05 ∗ (u(0is−i)− u(1i, s−i)))
This has been translated to the u notation for consistency, but was derived
from base variables in [11].
This is then iterated on t until a solution is found (or 500 rounds). The
players clamped to 1 were chosen in a greedy method. For many of the previ-
ously examined cases, a NE is not guaranteed, but we have made sure the cases
examined here do have NE when all players are investing.
3.3.2 Constraints
The initial parameters p, L, c are set to match the settings in [11]. One of the
key indicating factors used was Ri =
ci
Li
. In these simulations, given that c and






These allow for the payo ratio of Ri = .009 used in [11] to be preserved.
This implies that a low payo occurrence, such as being impacted by the lack
of security investment, is roughly 110 times worse than investing. The qij are
then generated randomly from a normal distribution to ll out the game.
To maintain consistency, the cases examined are still required to have a NE
at all players investing, which was not required in [11]. We remove the restraint
that there is an NE at all players not investing in order to help accommodate the
other restriction set forth in [11]. The players initial state is still non-investment.
In the cases used, 50 iterations were sucient to reach equilibrium.
For the dynamic method, the game was run starting with no players clamped
to invest, then adding players in order until the whole system tipped. Typical
results are shown in Figure 6. All players not plotted in the graphs in Figure 6
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are locked into investing.
The same method was then run clamping the results of the algebraic method
to invest, obtaining the results in Figure 7. Again, all players not plotted in the
gures are locked into investing.
3.3.3 Results and Commentary
The plotting / learning route used in the dynamic method was run rst against
all players, then against candidate tipping sets from the algebraic method. In
the second case, we used only players from the candidate tipping sets as players
who can be locked into investment. This validated that the algebraic method
did nd feasible solutions, and solutions that converge quickly. Both methods
performed well, although some better for dierent types of cases.
Generally the algebraic method does well at identifying key players to tip the
system, but fails to take advantage of cascade eects, and thus overestimates
the size of the tipping sets. The dynamic method fairs better with cascades,
but does little to identify key players, using a simple greedy approach to adding
players to the tipping set. This observation prompts investigation into using a
combination of the methods.
The results of the two methods were often similar. This appears to be
because of the random nature of our interdependence. As observed above, dif-
ferently constructed games can have signicant impacts on performance. Games
with key players can be missed by the dynamic method, and games with long
cascades in their optimal solutions often are missed by the algebraic method.
3.3.4 Combination of Methods
Given the characteristics above, a combination of these two methods was at-
tempted. To do this, the algebraic method was used to identify key players,
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Figure 6: Dynamic Results
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
then the dynamic method was used. to trim away players not needed to tip the
system. This means that fewer combinations of players locked to investment
need be considered. It also takes advantage of the algebraic method's ability to
nd key players as well as the dynamic method's ability to cope with cascades.
A case was chosen that had such cascades, a known weakness of the algebraic
method. The tipping set was still required to tip the entire system, but could be
chosen only from the output of the algebraic method. The results are in Figure
8. In this case, the algebraic method found a candidate set of eight players,
which was reduced to four by the dynamic method.
As previously mentioned, all players without an investment graph are clamped
to investing.
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Figure 7: Algebraic Results
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)






We have analyzed the methods for nding minimum tipping sets in SI games,
and transformed the problem into a graph theory problem. We then presented
a graph-based algorithm to nd a minimum tipping set. We then examined
the complexity of the general case of Airline Security games. This motivates an
approximation method, backed by hypercube sampling and an algebraic method
to approximate the minimum tipping set for general Airline Security games.
This method is then placed in context with dynamic methods for identifying




There are several possible improvements on the performance of the above meth-
ods. Methods of trimming the input space could show great improvements, as
restricting the number of players has large benets. It is of interest if the
players can be subdivided before running the algorithm, to tip the system in
groups. There are also tunable parameters that could be investigated. Allowing
short cascades, for example, could improve the accuracy of the approximated
sets. There is also the fact that the algebra used in the approximation can use
compacting methods to collapse some of the combinations of candidates.
This could also impact more loosely dened games. There are many types of
games that lack some of the structure of the airline security games, but similar
methods may be able to be employed. It appears these methods would work
well in pure dynamic games, without perfect foresight. There is also promise
from incorporating incremental incentives, instead of all at once. The work
examining methods used in [11] show promise in examining how this complex
approximation could be incorporated into existing methods of approximation.
It may also become easier to solve the problem with a relaxed concept of tipping,
for example, if there is interest in hitting most of a group, not the whole group.
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